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obert J. Barro’s article, “Inﬂation and
Growth,” presents the results of
regressions of per capita output
growth on inﬂation across countries and
over time. He ﬁnds that there is a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant negative slope coefﬁcient
estimate in these regressions; the estimate
usually lies between 0.02 and 0.04. As
far as I can tell, Barro wants to interpret
these results as follows. Suppose a central
bank can choose between two different
monetary policies. The ﬁrst monetary poli-
cy induces an average inﬂation rate of 5
percent per year, whereas the second mon-
etary policy induces an average inﬂation
rate of 15 percent per year. Barro argues
that his regressions imply that growth will
be on average 0.3 percent higher per year
in the ﬁrst monetary policy regime. 
Of course, the problem with this inter-
pretation is obvious: Growth and inﬂation
are both endogenous variables. Given this
endogeneity, can we really view this nega-
tive coefﬁcient as being an opportunity for
the monetary authorities to inﬂuence
growth rates?
My discussion has three parts. In the
ﬁrst part I set up and calibrate a simple
macroeconomic model. In the model,
monetary policy has no effect on growth.
Yet, because of endogeneity bias, regres-
sions of growth on inﬂation produce coef-
ﬁcient estimates on the order of 0.024.
This indicates that the quantitative magni-
tude of Barro’s estimates are entirely con-
sistent with classical models of money in
which monetary policy has no effect on
long-run growth. In the second part of my
discussion, I assess Barro’s attempts to
eliminate this endogeneity bias with in-
strumental variables. I conclude that these
attempts are not very convincing. I sum-
marize my conclusions in the third part.
A CALIBRATED 
CLASSICAL MODEL
Consider a world with many coun-
tries. Within each country, individuals are
identical and have homothetic preferences
over consumption streams. Let kt-1  denote
capital at the end of period (t-1). It pro-
duces period t output yt according to the
production function:
(1) yt Akt-1.
In this formula, A is the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital; it is constant over
time. Output in period t gets split into
consumption and investment as follows:
(2) yt ct it,
(3) kt kt-1(1-d) it.
In these formulas, ctis period t con-
sumption, it is period t investment, and d
is the depreciation rate of capital, which is
constant over time.
In addition to the above physical con-
straints, individuals within each country
face a cash-in-advance constraint on con-
sumption. The central bank in each coun-
try prints money so that the money supply
grows at a constant rate. It distributes the
money through lump-sum transfers to in-
dividuals in the economy.
In this environment, there is a classical
dichotomy: Central banks are not able to
inﬂuence the growth rate of real output.
Instead, the growth rate of real output,
which is constant over time, is determined
by the parameters governing preferences
and by the technology parameters A and d,
which might be indirectly affected by gov-
ernment ﬁscal policy. Prices are then deter-
mined through money market equilibrium:
(4)
where Ct is equilibrium consumption, and
is the money supply in period t.
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This gives rise to the following rela-
tionship between inﬂation and growth
across countries.  Let 
be the inﬂation rate in country j, let 
be the money growth
rate in country j, and let gj=1nYj
t+1 1nYj
t
be the growth rate of real output in country
j. Then money market clearing says that
(5) pj µj gj,
or equivalently
(6) gj pj µj.
In keeping with the spirit of monetary
neutrality, assume that µj and gj are sto-
chastically independent across countries;
otherwise, it is trivial to match any covari-
ation across countries in output growth
and inﬂation with a classical model. Sup-
pose, as in Barro’s article, an econometri-
cian has data across countries on gj and pj,
but not on µj. He runs a regression of gj on
pj. The regression coefﬁcient is given by
(7) Cov(gj,pj)/Var(pj)
Var(µj)/{Var(µj) Var(gj)},
where all moments are calculated across
countries. 
Thus even though monetary policy
has no effect on long-run growth rates in
this model, there is a negative correlation
between inﬂation and output growth. This
is because of the usual classical effect:
When output growth is high, relatively lit-
tle money is chasing a lot of goods. Hence
the growth of goods prices will be low, so
inﬂation will be low.
The predictions of a classical model
are certainly consistent with the sign of
Barro’s regression estimates. Can a classical
model also replicate the magnitude of 
Barro’s estimates? Clearly, the quantitative
predictions of a classical model depend on
the cross-country moments Var(µj) and
Var(gj). I calibrated these parameters using
data on p. 153 of Barro’s Macroeconomics.
I found that in his sample of 79 countries,
the sample variance of output growth
equals 0.000265, whereas the sample vari-
ance of money growth equals 0.0107.
Using these estimates, we see that the pre-
diction of the calibrated model for the
slope coefﬁcient b is
(8) bpred 0.000265/(0.0107
0.000265) 0.024.
Thus when the model is calibrated to ac-
c o rd with data on money and output gro w t h ,
one obtains slope coefﬁcients in re g re s s i o n s
of growth on inﬂation that are quantitatively
similar to those obtained by Barro. When
viewed in this light, his coefﬁcient estimates
appear to be evidence in favor of the long-
run neutrality of money gro w t h .1




1 Barro’s estimates are based on
pooled cross-sectional regres-
sions. The predictions of the
classical model for these types
of regression estimates will be
inﬂuenced by the relative mag-
nitudes of the within-country
variance of output growth and
money growth.
Quantitative Perf o rmance of 
a Classical Model*
Slope Coefﬁcients in Regressions of 
Dy on Dp in Inﬂation-Based Subsamples
Inﬂation Range Predicted Estimated
[0, ¥) 0.024 0.35 (0.140)
[0, 10%] 0.296 0.224 (0.120)
[10%, 25%] 0.116 0.058 (0.088)
[25%, ¥) 0.020 0.085 (0.044)
Conditional Means of Inﬂation 
and Growth
†
Fast Growers Slow Growers
Predicted mean inﬂation 0.085 0.109
Estimated mean inﬂation 0.091 0.119





* All variables were estimated using data on inﬂation and output growth from
79 countries (p. 153 of Barro’s Macroeconomics). Standard errors are consis-
tent in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
The predictions are generated from a classical model in which Dy and Dm
are assumed to have independent distributions given by their empirical distri-
bution functions in the same data set.
† Fast growers grow faster than the median country, whereas slow growers
grow slower than the median country.MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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model does in terms of matching various
aspects of the empirical joint distribution
of inﬂation and output growth across
countries. I calculate this empirical distrib-
ution using the data from Barro’s textbook.
The calibrated model basically matches all
of the features of interest of the empirical
distribution. Table 1 serves to underscore
that there is no need to abandon the clas-
sical model to explain cross-country data
on inﬂation and output growth.
INSTRUMENTS?
Barro is certainly aware of the endo-
geneity problem described previously. He
attempts to deal with it by using instru-
ments that satisfy two conditions: They are
demonstrably correlated across countries
with inﬂation and plausibly uncorrelated
across countries with the error term in his
growth regressions. He discards a measure
of central bank independence because it
does not satisfy the ﬁrst requirement. He
ﬁnds two instruments, lagged inﬂation and
previous colonial status, that are both
demonstrably correlated with inﬂation.
The question is whether they are plausibly
uncorrelated with the error term in the
growth regressions. 
For both instruments, it seems that
the answer to this question must be no.
Suppose one believes that inﬂation is pos-
sibly correlated across countries with the
error term in the growth regression (as the
preceding section argues and as Barro
seems to feel might be a problem). Pre-
sumably, within a given country, inﬂation
is a stationary process. Then if inﬂation
averaged over 1971–80 is correlated across
countries with unexplained growth differ-
entials, so should inﬂation averaged over
1965–70 be correlated.
The previous colonial status regressor
is more interesting. Colonial status, how-
ever, presumably affects a country’s ability
to grow in ways other than through inﬂa-
tion (or through the other explanatory
variables). For example, recent theoretical
work by Tamura (1995) suggests that
being part of a larger language network
might lead a country to grow faster. If
Tamura’s reasoning is right, being under
British or French rule may tie a country
into a wider language-economic network
than that of a country under Spanish or
Portuguese rule and therefore lead to
higher growth in the British and French
colonies.
CONCLUSION
Barro argues that his regression esti-
mates indicate that central banks can have
an effect on long-run growth rates through
monetary policy. In the ﬁrst part of this
commentary, I discuss the predictions of a
classical model for the slope coefﬁcient in a
regression of growth on inﬂation. I show
that the sign of this coefﬁcient is generally
negative because high growth tends to 
generate low inﬂation. More important, 
I demonstrate that the data on relative
magnitudes of the variances of output
growth and money growth across countries
imply that this classical effect is quantita-
tively consistent with the estimates Barro
obtained. In the second part of my discus-
sion, I argue that Barro’s attempts to deal
with endogeneity bias through appropriate
choice of instruments are unconvincing.
My analysis indicates that the coefﬁ-
cient estimates obtained by Barro are
quantitatively consistent with a simple
classical model of money and growth.
Given my results, I would recommend that
policymakers not view lower long-run
growth as a penalty of inﬂationary mone-
tary policy. Moreover, given the scarce
amount of time available to economic the-
orists, I would recommend that they not
spend it trying to build models that pre-
dict large growth consequences for mone-
tary policy.
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